CHANGE
IN THE SECURITY ARCHITECTURE IN EUROPE
AS A RESULT OF THE WAR IN UKRAINE

ABSTRACT

At the beginning of the 21st century, many analysts predicted a reset in international relations and an upcoming change in terms of dominance on the international arena, in which the US would lose its primacy to a multipolar world with China and Russia as key players. The economic crisis, the COVID-19 pandemic and currently the war in Ukraine have raised growing concern about the future of the European security system. Until Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, many European Union countries functioned with the belief that Europe would never suffer from war again and that the citizens of UE would always live in a free and cohesive Europe. At present, Europe needs to adapt to the changes in the European security environment and prepare accordingly, all the more that Ukraine has become a theatre of superpowers’ competition for a new European and, consequently, global order. The aim of the article is to present the change that is taking place in the European security environment in the context of the war in Ukraine.

Keywords:
Ukraine, war, European order, European security.

INTRODUCTION

At the beginning of the 21st century, many analysts predicted a reset in international relations and an upcoming change in terms of dominance on the international arena, in which the US would lose its primacy to a multipolar world with China and Russia as key players. The economic crisis, the COVID-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine are causing growing concern about the future of the European security system. Until Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, many European Union countries "functioned" with the belief that
Europe would never suffer from war again and that the citizens of this Organization would always live in a free and cohesive Europe. Russia’s war with Ukraine disproved this belief, and moreover caused fear that military operations could spread to other countries, which in consequence could even lead to a nuclear conflict. According to The Economist, the Russian invasion of Ukraine became a “decisive moment” in the reorganization of the European order, but was it the only one? The Russo-Ukrainian war is not only a regional war, but also an important historical moment in which Russia challenged the Western world and shifted the geopolitical plate of influence closer to the West. Although the outcome of this war is currently unknown, it will certainly have far-reaching consequences for the European continent, the Asia-Pacific region and the global security system.¹

At present, the vast majority of European countries, faced with the war in Ukraine, must adapt to the changes taking place and react accordingly, all the more so as Ukraine has become a theatre of competition between powers for a new European order, and consequently a global one. Within this structure, Russia, partly China and its allies (e.g. Iran) compete on one side, and on the other side of this structure there are the United States and its allies in NATO and the European Union.² The concept of a broad approach to the architecture of European security assumed, first of all, the cooperation of already existing regional and subregional organizations in order to develop such mechanisms and processes that, in the long term, would ensure political and military stability on the continent through bottom-up unforced integration in the field of broadly understood European security.³ However, the Russo-Ukrainian war is aimed at both the existence of Ukraine as an independent state and the overall European security order. Instead of the rules-based world order that emerged after World War II, Russia is trying to achieve a system of great power spheres of interest in which small and medium-sized states have no autonomy in making security policy choices.⁴

³ D.J. Mierzejewski, European security in the conditions of globalization changes, ed. A. Marszałek, Toruń 2011, p. 229.
⁴ This is how the war in Ukraine is changing Swedish security, https://www.forsvaramakten.se/sv/aktuellt/2022/09/sa-forandrar-krieget-i-ukraina-svensk-sakerhet/, [15.11.2022].
THE EUROPEAN SECURITY ORDER AFTER 1989

In the mid-nineteenth century, European societies rose up against absolutism and the system of government established at the Congress of Vienna in the form of the pan-European revolution of the Spring of Nations (1848-1849). Almost a century and a half later, from 1989 onwards, another revolution swept across Europe, this time against communism. As the most important events in most countries of the communist bloc took place in the second half of 1989, the process of political and social change in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe was called the "Autumn of Nations". Although it began in Poland, the historical changes would not have happened without the transformations that took place in the Soviet Union itself.5 In 2005, Russian President Vladimir Putin, in his annual State of the Union address, stated, among other things, that the collapse of the Soviet Union was the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century.6 Currently, there is no one point of view among scientists as to what was the main cause of the collapse of the USSR and whether it was possible to prevent, or at least stop the process of its collapse. Among the possible reasons for the collapse of the USSR, one can distinguish: centrifugal nationalist tendencies, the authoritarian nature of Soviet society and gradual fascism, but also the dominance of one ideology, the crisis of confidence in the economic system, the fall in world oil prices, and the subversive activity of foreign intelligence services. Nevertheless, as is most often believed, the main reason for the collapse of the USSR was the conceptual uncertainty of the entire Russian civilization governance, then called the Soviet Union,7 but the breakthrough moment that decided about its collapse was the so-called August Coup of August 19, 1991, in which a group of "hardliners" (party members fanatically devoted to communist ideology) and military men tried to seize control of the country and stop the reforms by bringing Gennady Yanayev to the very top of government.

The collapse of the Warsaw Pact (July 1, 1991) and the USSR changed the geopolitical situation in Europe, also leading to many discussions about a new map of Eastern Europe. Professor J. Kłoczowski believed, for example, that the term “Central Europe” prevailed in the historiography of post-

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Habsburg countries. The Polish discourse, however, insisted on the concept of Central and Eastern Europe, which was defined as an area lying in the European space between Germany and Russia, in a slightly different sense between the Baltic Sea, the Black Sea, and the Adriatic Sea. Instead, the fall of the communist regimes in Europe caused a "shake-up" of European geopolitics, the first dimension of which was the disappearance of the "old" and the emergence of many new states – East Germany was absorbed by West Germany in the process of reunification (October 3, 1990), Czechoslovakia was divided into two republics, the Slovak and the Czech Republic, Poland began to border seven countries instead of three, Yugoslavia broke up into seven states (Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Kosovo, North Macedonia, Serbia) and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics disappeared, giving rise to fifteen new states.

Emerging from the chaos and economic troubles that characterized the first years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia became more assertive on its borders and less willing to cooperate with other European states. On March 21, 1996, Russia proposed the adoption of a Charter for European Security, which would provide the basis for the conclusion of a legally binding treaty establishing a security system in the OSCE area. This system would consist of:

- bilateral and multilateral security guarantees;
- a network of agreements on the coordination of activities between existing institutions;
- European Security Council (or OSCE Executive Committee) with appropriate powers.

However, European states did not accept the Russian proposal. Indeed, Russia sought to strengthen the OSCE institutionally, as it is actually the only organization it co-founded and of which it has been and still is a full participant. An additional objective for Russia was to gain and strengthen international recognition for the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), to obtain for it a status as for the European Union. From Russia’s point of view, such a security model was also intended to prevent the marginalisation of the state in the international arena. At the same time, the US sphere of influence moved further east towards Russia’s borders, mainly through institutions such as NATO and the European Union, and many countries of the former communist bloc had

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8) J. Kłoczowski, Central and Eastern Europe and its place in Europe, "Rocznik Instytutu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej" ("Yearbook of the Institute of Central and Eastern Europe") 2007, issue 1, pp. 11-33.
9) D.J. Mierzejewski, European security in the conditions of globalization changes, op. cit., p. 228
already joined them. The accession of the Central and Eastern European countries to the European Union was a complicated process of a political, economic and legal nature, but it gave rise to the consolidation of the economies of European countries and contributed to increasing their security through a community of interests. NATO, on the other hand, was to be the "cornerstone" for a larger, pan-European security architecture. Thus, the accession of the former communist states to the Alliance meant tangible benefits for the societies of the new member states, including, inter alia, the modernization of the armed forces and the rescue system, professionalization of the army, an increase in the sense of security and stability, an increase in the importance of a given country in the international arena, or an influx of foreign investments due to increased stability. The accession of "new" states to NATO was often treated as a kind of "vestibule" to the European Union. Of course, formally it was unrelated, but in practice NATO membership helped the countries of Central and Eastern Europe to pursue their integration with the EU.

In a comprehensive analysis of the European security environment, American political scientist George Friedman predicted a war between Russia and Europe after 2020 and concluded that Russia would lose it. And the consequences of this lost war can even lead to its disintegration, as happened, for example, in 1917 and again in 1991.

In the post-Cold War era, Russia expressed strong dissatisfaction with the existence of NATO and the fact that Eastern European countries, hitherto under the influence of the Soviet Union, became NATO members. After Vladimir Putin came into power, state control over the energy sector was further strengthened, establishing the foundations of domestic governance, and then during the Munich Security Conference in 2007, Putin sharply criticized the unipolar system centered on the US and NATO. A new security system in Europe was announced by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov during the meeting of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe held in

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11 D.[. Mierzejewski, *European security in the conditions of globalization changes*, op. cit., p. 201


13 S. Lee, *The Ukrainian crisis and possible changes in the international order*, https://www.asaninst.org/contents/%EC%9A%B0%ED%81%AC%EB%9D%BC%EC%9D%B4%EB%82%98-%EC%9C%84%EA%B8%B0%EC%99%80-%EA%B5%AD%EC%A0%9C%EC%A7%88%EC%84%9C%EC%9D%98-%EB%B3%80%ED%99%94-%EA%B0%80%EB%8A%A5%EC%84%B1/, [14.11.2022].
Stockholm on December 2-3, 2021. This system would stop NATO from expanding further eastwards. It is all the more justified that the Russian Federation considers the activities of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to be a great threat to itself. According to S. Lavrov, the architecture of strategic stability is being violently destroyed, and the change of states neighbouring Russia, creating "bridgeheads" for confrontation with Russia, and the deployment of NATO forces in the immediate vicinity of regions of strategic importance for Russian security is categorically unacceptable.\footnote{Stop NATO’. Russia will propose a new arrangement in Europe, https://dorzeczy.pl/swiat/234151/rosja-zaproponuje-nowy-uklad-o-bezpieczenstwie-w-europie.html, [15.11.2022].}

\textbf{THE IMPORTANCE OF UKRAINE FOR THE SECURITY OF THE CENTRAL EUROPEAN AREA}

It is believed that the importance of Ukraine in creating European security goes far beyond its role as a "disputed borderline", a buffer state and a flashpoint that great powers try to control for their own imperial aspirations. However, this Eastern European country is of geo-economic importance. It contains infrastructure connecting Russia with the European peninsula, including oil and gas pipeline networks and motorways. Therefore, Ukraine can and should function as a corridor for trade and energy flows. In addition, the Dnieper River and Ukraine's access to the Black Sea through the port of Odessa mean that Ukraine's geography offers an optimal gateway to participate in international trade and harness its benefits to foster development and prosperity.\footnote{J. M. Alonso-Trabanco, The Geoeconomic Front of the Ukraine War, https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/the-geoeconomic-front-of-the-ukraine-war/, [16.11.2022].} Ukraine has large and rich deposits of both coal and metallic minerals such as iron, titanium, manganese and uranium, which are needed for various industrial applications. The country is also an important "warehouse" of neon, a gaseous chemical element that is crucial in the production of chips and lasers. Another important aspect is that Ukraine has highly fertile land (known as chernozem, or "black earth"), which is suitable for the cultivation of various crops, including wheat, corn and barley, but also for the cultivation of cash crops, i.e. potatoes, sugar beets, sunflowers and pumpkins. Significantly, Ukraine’s role as a valuable granary is depicted even in the colours of its flag: it depicts a landscape of a bright yellow wheat field under a blue sky.\footnote{Ibidem.}

Z. Brzeziński in "The Grand Chessboard", wrote, for example, that Ukraine is "a new, important field on the Eurasian chessboard and is a geopolitical pivot, because the very existence of an independent Ukrainian state helps...
to transform Russia." Without Ukraine, Russia ceases to be a Eurasian empire: it may still try to achieve imperial status, but then it would be a predominantly Asian empire, constantly drawn into ruinous conflicts with the recently sovereign nations of Central Asia, which would not accept the loss of independence and would be supported by brotherly Islamic countries in the south.\(^\text{17}\)

Ukraine has been an independent state since 1991, but Russia considers it part of its sphere of influence and is pursuing a modern version of Brezhnev's policy, according to which Ukraine would have "limited sovereignty", as was the case, for example, with Poland when it was in the Soviet sphere of influence. From the beginning of the Russian campaign against Ukraine, Russian political technologists have been constructing a narrative about the Russian world being reborn to correct the injustice imposed on Russia by the Western powers after the collapse of the Soviet Union. In 1997, Alexander Dugin published in The Foundations of Geopolitics: *The Geopolitical Future of Russia*, a comprehensive exposition of his worldview, calling on Russia to rebuild "its" influence by organizing various alliances and conquests, and to challenge the "Atlantic Empire" led by the United States. According to A. Dugin, Ukraine should be annexed by Russia because "Ukraine as a state has no geopolitical significance, no special cultural, or universal significance, no geographical uniqueness, or ethnic exclusivity, and its specific territorial ambitions pose a huge threat to all of Eurasia and without solving the Ukrainian problem, there is no point in talking about continental politics at all.\(^\text{18}\) A. Dugin also believes that the territory of Ukraine should be divided into several zones corresponding to a range of geopolitical and ethnocultural realities. Thus, he indicates four zones, of which:

1) Eastern Ukraine (everything that lies east of the Dnieper River from Chernihiv to the Sea of Azov) is a densely populated territory with a predominance of the Great Russian ethnic group and Orthodox Little Russian population. As he emphasizes, this whole territory is close to Russia and culturally, historically, ethnically and religiously related to it. This technically well-developed region might as well be an independent geopolitical region, with wide autonomy, but in unconditional and strongest alliance with Moscow. Here, meridional integration is preferred, connecting the Kharkiv Oblast with the more northern (Belgorod, Kursk and Bryansk Oblasts) Russian territories, and spreading the structure southwards.


2) Crimea is a special geopolitical entity, traditionally distinguished by ethnic "mosaicism". It is therefore impossible to leave Crimea to "sovereign Ukraine", as this would pose a direct threat to Russia's geopolitical security and cause ethnic tensions in Crimea itself. Taking all these considerations into account, the conclusion is that it is necessary to give Crimea a special status and ensure maximum autonomy with direct strategic control from Moscow.

3) The central part of Ukraine from Chernihiv to Odessa, where Kyiv is located, is another finite region where the Little Russian ethnos and language are ethnically dominant, but Orthodoxy is the dominant religion. This Orthodox Little Russia, which is an independent geopolitical reality, culturally connected with eastern Ukraine and certainly included in the Eurasian geopolitical system.

4) Western Ukraine is heterogeneous. In the north, it is a separate region of Volhynia, south of Lviv Oblast (Galicia), further south of Transcarpathia (the western shelf) and finally the eastern part of Bessarabia. All of these regions are quite independent regions.19

What is worth remembering, A. Dugin called for the annexation of Crimea already in 2008, during Russia's war with Georgia, and in 2014 he stated that a war between Russia and Ukraine "is inevitable" and called on President V. Putin to intervene militarily in eastern Ukraine "to save Russia's moral authority." In the summer of 2021, V. Putin published a historic article in which he denied the right of the Ukrainian state to exist. Russian imperialism, which under the term "Russky Mir" claims the right to forcibly incorporate countries with Russian minorities, countries from the Orthodox culture, or even countries that were part of the Russian Empire, must be recognized as the main cause of the war in Ukraine. As part of the policy of "Russky Mir", the right of existence of the Ukrainian state, and even of Ukrainians as a separate nationality, is questioned. As part of this policy, they are supposed to be "lost" Russians who should be incorporated into the Russian state. It is also according to "Russky Mir" that the Russian Federation has the right and duty to "defend" the Russian minority in neighbouring countries against persecution. Such a statement is extremely dangerous for the countries of the former USSR, because after their collapse many Russians stayed in the newly established republics and they constitute a noticeable minority, for example in the Baltic states, Belarus and also Ukraine.20 V. Putin also criticized NATO's "expansion" after 1997 as a threat to

20 M. Delong, "Russky Mir" as a tool of Russian geopolitical expansion on the territory of Ukraine, "Przegląd Geopolityczny" 2020, No. 33, pp. 50-54.
security and demanded that Ukraine be granted the status of a state without the possibility of accession to NATO, and moreover, Russia officially recognized the Donetsk People’s Republic and Luhansk People’s Republic as independent states. Putin sought "guarantees" that Ukraine would never join NATO and wanted NATO allies to remove all troops from former Soviet republics and nations, but also not to place nuclear weapons on the territories of states that once belonged to the Warsaw Pact. However, the Ukrainian crisis also has its roots in the practices implemented by the US, which turned Ukraine into a "Western bastion" on the border with Russia. This Western strategy has three aspects, i.e. Ukraine’s integration with the European Union, Ukraine’s transformation into a pro-Western liberal democracy, and most importantly, Ukraine’s integration with NATO. This plan was announced at the NATO summit in Bucharest in April 2008, when the alliance announced that Ukraine and Georgia "would become members of NATO". However, Russian leaders made it clear at the time that they saw the decision as an existential threat and had no intention of including the two countries into NATO.

Russia attacked Ukraine on February 24, 2022, and this was the day on which the previous Russian-Ukrainian crisis of 2014 moved into a new phase of conflict. Russia, under the pretext of a special operation, attacked Ukraine not only to overthrow the "Ukrainian regime" and reintegrate Ukraine into its immediate sphere of influence, but also, more fundamentally, to change the security system in Europe to its advantage. The invasion, which seems extremely understandable, met with widespread international condemnation, including sanctions imposed on Russia. The Russian aggression in Ukraine has re-evaluated many influential forecasts of the development of the post-Cold War security order in Europe. Assumptions regarding its peaceful development log-ic, the primacy of law over individual claims of nations, or the inviolability of borders have been brutally verified by Moscow’s actions, undermining the

22 Mearsheimer: The real source and possible direction of the crisis in Ukraine. Experts have something to say, https://www.hk01.com/article/792152?utm_source=01articlecopy&utm_medium=referral, [04.11.2022].
23 In April 2014, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation began aggression as part of a hybrid war on the south-eastern area of the Ukrainian state, conducting direct military operations there. As a result, two internationally unrecognised entities were established on the territory of Donbass: Lugansk People’s Republic and Donetsk People’s Republic (temporarily they formed a joint political project called the Federal Republic of Novorossiya). The ongoing armed conflict caused the emigration of about 30% of the population and the economic collapse of the region. T. Piechal, War republics in Donbass a year after the outbreak of the conflict, "OSW Commentaries" 2015-06-17.
principles of international cooperation developed after 1989 and strategic partnership with the West.\textsuperscript{24} After failures in the initial stages of the attack and demonstrating significant shortcomings in combat capability, Russian forces plunged into a bloody, costly and uncertain war against a determined Ukrainian nation supported by the West.\textsuperscript{25}

The war also triggered "seismic waves" that radiated from the "epicentre", which had a widespread and far-reaching impact on the security of many countries. The first is the impact on raw material prices. As Russia and Ukraine are major producers and exporters of oil, gas, metals and food, soaring prices for these commodities have caused energy difficulties around the world, leading to a significant increase in inflation. Secondly, trade flows have been severely disrupted with serious consequences for Russia and Ukraine’s trading partners, in particular the Caucasus, Central Asia, Eastern Europe and the Baltic States; supply chain disruptions have also spread to the wider region. The war has also caused a major refugee crisis in Europe as nearly 6 million people fled Ukraine in less than three months. Thirdly, the war led to tighter financing conditions, both as a result of poor performance in many economies and indirectly as a result of faster-than-expected tightening of monetary policy by advanced economies\textsuperscript{26}.

THE FORMATION OF THE EUROPEAN SECURITY SYSTEM

The war in Ukraine has caused a fundamental change in the policy of most European countries towards Russia. It can be assumed that since February 24, 2022, another geopolitical revolution has been emerging in Europe, which, among others, gives Poland an unexpected chance to play an important role in creating the European security environment. Poland’s geographical location has strengthened its position as a gateway to the Western presence in the current war. This is due, among others, to the common border with Ukraine, which is about 530 kilometers, thanks to which Poland has turned into a transit country for Western equipment and weapons to Ukraine.\textsuperscript{27} Poland is "on the front line" that supports Ukraine, because it has accepted millions of refugees,

\textsuperscript{24} R. Kupiecki, \textit{Armed conflict in Ukraine and European security}, "Zeszyty Naukowe AON" 2015, No. 3(100), p. 9.
\textsuperscript{26} P. O. Gurancha, Shifting Geopolitical Tectonic Plates, https://www.imf.org/zh/Publications/fandd/issues/2022/06/shifting-geopolitical-tectonic-plates-straight-talk, [15.11.2022].
\textsuperscript{27} H. Abu Talib, \textit{Russia and Ukraine... a step towards correcting the mistakes of history}, https://acpss.ahram.org.eg/News/17407.aspx, [07.11.2022].
but also provides humanitarian and military aid. It is also a country deeply familiar with Russia and its imperial nature. Even before the start of hostilities, Poland called on EU and NATO countries to actively supply Ukraine with weapons and to impose severe anti-Russian sanctions. Now Poland is in favour of a complete trade blockade of Russia and the fast-track integration of Ukraine into the European Union, bypassing the principles of unification. The EU’s proposal of candidate status to Ukraine is a key geopolitical move, yet many leaders continue to stress that Ukraine’s membership is not guaranteed and even still unlikely.

Before the outbreak of war, on February 17, 2022, the UK, Poland, and Ukraine signed a tripartite memorandum of understanding to form a security alliance in response to Russia’s military threat to Ukraine. Two days later, during the Munich Security Conference, the Ukrainian crisis took centre-stage, and the Prime Minister of the Republic of Poland, M. Morawiecki, emphasized the need to provide Ukraine with defensive weapons. On the other hand, the day before the outbreak of war, the Lublin Triangle Summit was held in Kiev. Poland condemned President Vladimir Putin’s decision to recognize the self-proclaimed "Donetsk People’s Republic" and the "Luhansk People’s Republic", believing that "this decision is a clear and indisputable challenge to Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity". The Polish-Ukrainian Alliance is considered to be an important chapter in the geostrategic repositioning of Russia. In general, the ultimate goal is to exercise political control over a vast geographical strip stretching from the coast of the Baltic Sea to the north-eastern Black Sea, at least that was the ambition of Józef Piłsudski, one of the founders of Polish geopolitical thought.

France and Germany have also gradually changed their attempts to reach a compromise with Russia by appeasement and are now putting more and more pressure on Russia to end the war. While the Federal Republic has largely established itself in the foreign policy comfort zone in recent decades, more and more partners from the Western world are expecting the largest and

32 F. Yujun, The Russo-Ukrainian conflict is a major turning point in the world order, https://iis.fudan.edu.cn/ca/40/c6897a444992/page.htm, [11/19/2022].
richest member of the EU to further reorient its policy towards Russia and line up with Ukraine and the Central and Eastern Europe states, which have talked about the threat from Russia for a long time. All the more so that confidence in Germany has recently been declining in Europe, as exemplified by voices from Lithuania, stating, among others, that German soldiers are not a guarantee of security in the face of a conflict with Russia, thus "together with the Lithuanian army staff, we should let the Germans go from their service and invite Polish, British, American, or Swedish soldiers to defend Lithuania". However, the first noticeable change in Germany’s policy towards Russia was the decision to supply Ukraine with anti-tank weapons and Stinger missile systems, as well as Chancellor Olaf Scholz's announcement that the federal budget for 2022 will allocate EUR 100 billion for necessary investments and armament projects, and to increase their defense spending to over 2% of GDP. This is all the more important as the policy of Angela Merkel's government was extremely restrained towards the development of the German armed forces and the expenditure of 2% of GDP for defense, in accordance with the assumptions of the NATO Summit in Newport in 2014. This was, moreover, the cause of political disputes in relations with United States during the presidency of Donald Trump. As a result, shortly after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the inspector general of the Bundeswehr, Gen. Alfons Mais assessed that "the Bundeswehr is more, or less empty" and in his opinion the options that the German army can offer to its allies are extremely limited. Like Germany, the position of Hungary in Europe has weakened. Hungary is trying to stay astride, which is a short-sighted and misguided policy, and that will do nothing in terms of Europe's effectiveness. However, unlike Germany, which has enormous political and economic power and which finds it relatively easier to become independent of Russian energy resources, Hungary finds it more difficult because it has no alternative to these resources.

Until the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, four battalion-sized battle-groups had been deployed on NATO’s eastern flank from July 2017: in Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, and Poland. During the NATO summit in February 2022, convened in response to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, a decision was

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35 Wawrzyk about the balance of power in Europe since the outbreak of the war: "Russia may be forced to start real talks", https://www.gazetaprawna.pl/wiadomosci/swiat/artykuly/8433307,wawrzyk-rosja-rozmowy-koniec-wojny-uklad-sil-geopolityka.html, [29.10.2022].
made to deploy four new Alliance battlegroups in Eastern Europe, i.e. in Slovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Romania. The head of the Alliance, Jens Stoltenberg, emphasized that this decision means a long-term increase in the Alliance’s military presence in the region of Central and Eastern Europe, where the number of NATO battle groups has been doubled.\textsuperscript{36}

The war in Ukraine has also caused a change in the security policy of hitherto neutral Sweden and Finland, which have begun the NATO accession process.\textsuperscript{37} The expansion of the Alliance’s northern flank, as believed, will further change the security architecture in Europe and should help to halt further Russian expansion. On the other hand, the accession of Finland and Sweden will increase the level of security in the Baltic Sea region, where Russia would be the only state “locked” in the eastern edges of the Gulf of Finland and Estonia, and in the Kaliningrad exclave, held in check not only by Lithuania and Poland, but also by Sweden’s Gotland, the island with the largest strategic importance in the Baltic Sea.\textsuperscript{38} Finnish and Swedish NATO membership both enhance the security of both countries in a changing security environment and strengthen stability and security in the Baltic Sea region and Northern Europe.\textsuperscript{39}

**CONCLUSIONS**

A number of American scholars, including I. Wallerstein, C. Capchen, J. Mearsheimer, S. Huntington and others, while predicting a multipolar world in the future, felt a certain fear of it, because it is not as stable and secure as the unipolar world dominated by the United States. Wallerstein directly said that the post-hegemonic era is a period of chaos, disorder, instability, a future full of anxiety and battles. Analysing the modern world’s evolution towards multipolarity, University of Chicago professor John Mearsheimer argued that power relations after the Cold War would eventually lead to an unstable, multipolar world. On the other hand, according to J. Mearsheimer, bipolarity is immeasurable more stable because, firstly, a world consisting of two blocs has one dividing line; secondly, bipolarity generates an approximate balance of power between existing blocs; thirdly, a bipolar system is simpler and more predictable than a multipolar system, which reduces the possibility of political miscalculation.\textsuperscript{40}

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\textsuperscript{36} Ibidem. \\
\textsuperscript{37} D. Petkus, *We no longer need Western Europe*, op. cit. \\
\textsuperscript{38} D. Szacawa, *Sweden and Finland in the face of escalating tensions in Europe*, Institute of Central Europe, no. 520, Lublin 2022, pp. 1-3. \\
\textsuperscript{39} *Finland has applied for NATO membership*, https://um.fi/finland-och-nato, [19.11.2022]. \\
\textsuperscript{40} *Geopolitics at the turn of the 20th and 21st century*, http://casp-geo.ru/geopolitika-vtoroj-poloviny-xx-xxi-vv/, [20.11.2022].
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It can be stated that the Russian Federation creates kinetic and non-kinetic threats to the security of Central and Eastern European states. Since 2014, the greatest exemplification of Russian threats to security has been in Ukraine. Non-kinetic threats, however, include actions in the political, economic, information, cyber, information security spheres, generating threats to international security. In order to achieve strategic goals in its policy, the Kremlin uses low-intensity irregular actions, below the threshold of open aggression, which cannot be clearly defined. In the spectrum of activities used in it, however, the key are military activities carried out using conventional methods and non-military activities, the synchronized use of which is aimed at surprising the enemy, taking the initiative and gaining advantage through psychological interactions, activities carried out in cyberspace, camouflaged activities of a military and intelligence nature, and exerting economic pressure on the enemy.\textsuperscript{41}

The lessons learned so far from the war in Ukraine indicate that the Kremlin’s policy towards Ukraine has broader implications in terms of international and domestic policy. Russia seeks international acceptance for the Russian sphere of influence in the Commonwealth of Independent States, and a change in the geopolitical arrangement across Europe, which is to be based on the essentially post-Soviet standards defined by Russia – alternative to European standards.\textsuperscript{42} In these activities one can see the implementation of the project of rebuilding Russian statehood even within the borders of the former USSR, or including only Russia, Belarus and Ukraine. On the other hand, taking strategic control over Ukraine would be crucial for the success of Russian plans.\textsuperscript{43}

The war in Ukraine has changed the architecture of European security. A security crisis, an inflation crisis, and a migration crisis have emerged. The perception of the state and level of security in Europe has changed radically and, as estimated, the importance of Ukraine as one of the main factors of maintaining stability and security in the region has increased. However, fundamentally different thinking and acting are needed in shaping and creating the architecture of the European security environment. If the stake of European security is the long-term preservation of the unity of the West, then neither the United States nor Poland can be interested in "digging up old corpses", reminiscing about the old divisions into new and old Europe. Germany should also accept the change of situation, which requires looking at Russia as it really is and, above all, recognizing Ukraine as an inseparable player in European secu-

\textsuperscript{41} W.J. Nemeth, Future war and Chechnya: A case for hybrid warfare, Monterey, CA 2002; http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/5865/02Jun_Nemeth.pdf?sequence=1, [22.11.2022].

\textsuperscript{42} M. Menkiszak, The Putin doctrine..., [07.12.2022].

\textsuperscript{43} Statement of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the support group for Ukraine, op. cit. This document is in fact a plan to establish a formally and internationally guaranteed Russian protectorate over Ukraine.
rity. All leaders of European countries should think about the new situation, but also act coherently for the sake of security and, it is high time to break old habits, because only in this way can they contribute to improving common security. \(^{44}\) The impact of Russia’s decline in power can be perceived in both positive and negative ways. Positive, because the immediate threat of using conventional means against its opponents will be reduced, but it can also start the process of democratization of both Russia and its satellites, such as Belarus. Negative impact, however, may include Russia’s desire to maintain its position, even using weapons of mass destruction, which would have catastrophic consequences for the whole of Europe. Moreover, a weakened Russia could descend into anarchy. \(^{45}\)

The war in Ukraine has turned out to be an extremely important event that will fundamentally change and transform the global situation and the international order. Therefore, the consequences of this may also be different. Firstly, the game between the superpowers has become more complicated due to the outbreak of war in Ukraine. The conflict between the two superpowers, i.e. the US and Russia, is taking place today in Ukraine, so the confrontation between the great powers will not disappear in Europe in a short time, and the struggle for the strategic space around Russia will become even more visible in the future. Secondly, the uncertainty of geopolitical competition among the international community has increased. Among EU states, despite political declarations of condemnation of Russia, there are contradictory views on the community’s actions towards Russia and support for Ukraine, for example, Poland and the Baltic states advocate full isolation of Russia and broad support for Ukraine, while France and Germany seem to be more restrained towards weakening Russia. Thirdly, the war in Ukraine has a particularly negative impact on global security. There is a fear that further tensions and political and military confrontations between NATO and Russia may provoke Russia to escalate the conflict, or use nuclear weapons. Fourthly, after the war in Ukraine, trade between Russia and Europe will probably move from globalization to regionalization. This war, as it is estimated, may be a historic turning point leading to a change in the past security policy of European states, the militarization of Europe, and the creation of regional pacts within, or outside NATO and the EU. \(^{46}\)

However, the basis for Russian dominance in the post-Soviet area is believed to be the provisions in Russian strategic documents, in which the Krem-

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\(^{46}\) *Diverse perceptions of the war in Ukraine by Chinese scholars*, http://diverseasia.snu.ac.kr/?p=5739, [18.11.2022].
lin justifies its policy of restoring the unity process of the “Russian nation” within a strict integration bloc (e.g. the Eurasian Economic Union), or even a state organism, covering at least part of this area (the Union State of Russia and Belarus). Thus, it is a challenge for the West, perceived in Moscow as the main opponent of the implementation of its plans to create a new order in Europe, undermining the effects of the end of the Cold War. The threats arising from the provisions of the strategic documents of the Russian Federation therefore relate to the creation of Russia as a guarantor of the rights and protector of the Russian-speaking population abroad and to the specifically understood good-neighbourliness (limited sovereignty) as a condition for Moscow’s recognition of the independence and territorial integrity of post-Soviet states.

However, regardless of how the war in Ukraine ends, the balance of power in Europe will be strongly shifted in favour of the West, because Russia has lost the ability to influence the situation in Europe through its position, e.g. as the main supplier of natural resources, Europe is replacing Russia with other suppliers and no pro-Russian political party can operate freely without being accused of supporting war crimes, or terrorism in Ukraine, but also of being paid agents of Russia. According to the Centre for European Policy Analysis in Washington, it is not only Ukraine that is at stake, but the future of European and possibly Eurasian security as a whole, as the outcome of the war will have dire mid- and long-term consequences for regional theatres in Europe and for the role of the European Union and NATO, as well as for the future involvement of the US in European security. The shaping of the contemporary security architecture must therefore take into account the role, aspirations and interests of the superpowers. Omitting this sphere from the proposed concepts would make them utopian. At the same time, it is important that the interest of superpowers coincide with what the international community expects, and is not imperial in nature. However, it is the superpowers that bear the great responsibility for security, mainly due to their potential (including military potential) and their ability to influence the international situation. The superpowers should inspire and organize the security space, both globally and regionally, and should be accompanied by a great sense of responsibility in this mission.

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T. al-Shami, *Will the war in Ukraine become the beginning...*, op.cit., [14.11.2022]
Understandably, they will continue to compete with each other, but this competition must not have negative impact on global and European security.51

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